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President's capital market tasks pile up, from public-private task force to tougher listing requirements

President's capital market tasks pile up, from public-private task force to tougher listing requirements

Key tasks ordered by the President at the capital market policy roundtable / Graphic = Lee Ji-hye
Key tasks ordered by the President at the capital market policy roundtable / Graphic = Lee Ji-hye

President Lee Jae Myung has called on financial authorities to tackle a range of capital market reforms, from forming a public-private task force dedicated to capital market reform to promoting hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to improve the value of companies with low price-to-book (PBR) ratios.

The president's remarks have left financial authorities grappling with how to implement the proposals. Lee also cited controlling shareholders' high ownership stakes as a barrier to hostile M&As and raised the possibility of delisting companies, setting the stage for debate over potential harm to minority shareholders.

According to the financial investment industry on Tuesday, financial authorities have begun reviewing follow-up tasks for capital market reform after the capital market policy roundtable chaired by President Lee on the 13th.

At the roundtable, President Lee ordered the creation of a public-private joint TF responsible for capital market reform. The TF is a body in which the government, ruling and opposition parties, relevant agencies, and industry and market officials participate to identify and improve capital market tasks.

President Lee said that he would appoint a high-level head and receive direct reports. This is interpreted as an intention to form a specialized capital market TF to accelerate capital market policy.

The order followed opinions raised at the roundtable at the time that a long-term blueprint for the capital market was needed. Overseas, blueprints related to the capital market are consistently being released, such as the UK’s Kay Report, Japan’s Ito Report, and Taiwan’s Capital Market and Corporate Governance Roadmap.

As a measure to normalize low PBR companies, President Lee ordered that in addition to activating hostile M&A, options for delisting companies with excessively high major shareholder ownership ratios should also be explored.

He pointed out that while M&A is a method to check low PBR companies, it does not function if the major shareholder’s ownership ratio is high at 70–80%. However, side effects such as harm to minority shareholders are also a concern.

At the roundtable, President Lee said, “Shouldn’t we prevent them from effectively running monopolistic management while enjoying all the profits from growth?” and added, “If the major shareholder’s ownership ratio exceeds half in listing maintenance conditions, making control contests impossible, or if it is unclear whether 50% is appropriate but companies are operated too much like personal firms, shouldn’t we explore options to delist them from the market?” He further ordered a comprehensive investigation into mechanisms blocking hostile M&A and a review of measures that could activate such transactions.

Typically, stocks with a PBR below 1x are classified as undervalued. This means that their value in the stock market is lower than the value of the assets the company holds. Companies with many assets and stagnant growth are often in a perennial low PBR state.

The industry points out that there are 570 companies where the major shareholder’s ownership ratio exceeds 50% and the PBR is below 1x, making hostile M&A impossible. It is explained that if the controlling shareholder’s ownership ratio exceeds 50%, external activist funds or hostile M&A acquirers cannot threaten management control even if they secure shares.

However, voices are emerging that caution is needed in institutional design because strengthening delisting requirements could lead to harm to minority shareholders. If a company goes through the delisting process, it becomes difficult for minority shareholders to recover their investment funds, and even if companies decide on voluntary delisting due to strengthened requirements, minority shareholders will suffer losses. Undervalued companies may also be exposed to attacks by speculative capital or overseas activist funds rather than healthy checks.

An official from the financial investment industry said, “In trying to check major shareholder stakes, various side effects can arise, such as harm to minority shareholders due to delisting, increased exposure to hostile M&A, and companies consuming resources on defending management control rather than long-term investment or strategy formulation, making it difficult for financial authorities to reach an easy conclusion.”

"This article was translated using AI and may differ slightly from the original."