In recent discussions on the secret behind China's rapid advancement in high-tech science and technology, a contrast often invoked is "Engineering Nation China, Lawyerly Society United States" (Dan Wang, "Breakneck"). While frequently introduced with the phrase "China builds, the U.S. blocks," the author Dan Wang's actual intent is that the vastly different United States and China should maintain curiosity about each other and correct their own excesses (weaknesses) by learning from the virtues (strengths) of the other. What if we applied this perspective to ourselves? What virtues of others should we learn from to correct our own shortcomings?
In Dan Wang's view, the United States possesses the virtue of upholding democracy and individual rights, yet its legal systems, procedures, reviews, and appeals have hardened into a veto framework, weakening its capacity to actually construct housing, railways, power grids, and factories. Meanwhile, China absorbed the industrial and technological achievements and ambitions accumulated by the U.S. and the West in its own way, emerging as a competitor that threatens the United States in certain strategic industries. However, China's approach also produced violence such as the one-child policy and zero-COVID measures by treating people and society as design targets.
China's strength does not rest solely on a few leaders with engineering backgrounds. While the central government sets direction and goals, local governments, companies, universities, research institutes, component manufacturers, and supply chain actors repeatedly engaged in "learning by doing." Production process knowledge that is difficult to transfer through blueprints or academic papers accumulated among people, organizations, and regions. Of course, this ecosystem was not open or egalitarian. National objectives and resource allocation operated forcefully, and the costs of experimentation and growth were disproportionately borne by workers and local communities.
Korea is a case study of "industrialization through learning" proposed by A.H. Amsden. It was a learning-based developmental state that quickly learned proven technologies and industrial solutions from advanced nations and improved and disseminated them on the production floor. State support combined with corporate performance metrics, and bureaucrats, engineers, and workers accumulated experience together. However, this learning process was also hierarchical and left significant social costs in its wake.
Today, Korea's bottleneck lies not in an absolute shortage of talent but in the success formula of the past. In areas where answers are not pre-given—such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and climate technology—multiple actors must redefine problems anew and test solutions to address complex, intertwined socio-economic challenges. Yet our education, hiring, and evaluation systems still favor those who reproduce verified paths centered on correct answers. There is a critical need for more people to have opportunities to test real-world problems and to build an ecosystemic foundation that allows more individuals to accumulate and disseminate their capabilities.
There is no need—and indeed no possibility—to imitate China's breakneck pace. Korea must move from a catch-up learning state to a path-creating learning state. The state should provide direction and infrastructure but must not monopolize problem definition, solutions, or execution. More people and organizations should be allowed to create, fail, and learn; rapid opportunities must be granted based on capabilities revealed in this process, while citizens must be able to raise objections and demand corrections when misguided directions emerge. Just as important as what we can learn from China and the United States is what we will make them want to learn from us in the future.
in OPINION
