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[Gwanghwamun] Roller KOSPI and Approval Ratings

[Gwanghwamun] Roller KOSPI and Approval Ratings

The decline in approval ratings for the national administration is as dramatic as the drop of "Roller KOSPI" (a blend of roller coaster and KOSPI). Just three months ago, around the time of the the 3rd local elections, evaluations had completely reversed. This vividly underscores the volatility and duality of public sentiment that shifts capriciously. President Lee Jae-myung's approval rating plummeted vertically from the high-to-mid 60% range before the local elections to the late 30s–early 40% range recently. It mirrors the KOSPI, which broke through the 9,100 mark in June but has since fallen into the 6th,000s. Like a "six-thousand" stock lost and wandering aimlessly, there is growing concern that approval ratings may become stuck in the 30th% range.

More events have unfolded in the past three months than during the first year of President Lee Jae-myung's administration. Although the ruling party won, the local election defeat served as the starting point. Thanks to a semiconductor supercycle, the stock market had been trending upward but has now entered a correction phase amid debates over peak levels. A single-stock leveraged exchange-traded fund (ETF) introduced to defend against currency fluctuations was identified as the main culprit behind increased stock market volatility. The perception that "falling stock prices are due to policy failures" has become deeply ingrained in the public mind. Tax reform measures imposing higher taxes on ultra-high-value homes, multiple properties, and single non-residential homes sparked tax resistance far beyond expectations, despite being framed under the banners of equitable taxation and tax rationalization. Even lawmakers from the ruling party, alarmed by public sentiment, have demanded a complete re-examination. The so-called deterioration of "asset-related public sentiment" has acted as a major catalyst for the decline in national administration approval ratings.

What about the factional struggles over reform speed, direction, and priorities within the ruling party? The Democratic Party of Korea's the 17th convention resembled not a regular gathering but a full-scale war. The rifts were so deep that it seemed unbelievable they belonged to the same household. With both factional politicians and VIXX fans supporting the ruling party joining the "Ming-Qing conflict," party members and supporters split into two opposing camps, leading to division and mutual hostility. During this process, some of the "core support base" defected, and a significant number of moderates also departed. Approval ratings are dropping regardless of age, gender, social class, or political affiliation.

In this comprehensive crisis, the "the 30th cabinet reshuffle" was launched as a turning card to somehow escape the turbulent currents of national governance. A major reshuffle involving six ministries, including the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, was carried out. Although the scale of the reshuffle was larger than expected, overall evaluations remain lukewarm. Many assessments suggest it was less about "renewal" to shift policy direction and more focused on "unity" within the political camp. When the announcement of the reshuffle revealed that key Cheong Wa Dae staff were not among those replaced, even members of the ruling party expressed regret. The resignation of Kim Yong-beom, Cheong Wa Dae Jeong Chaek (Head), who announced his departure a day later, came too late but was likely an inevitable choice for a government facing its greatest crisis since taking office, at least from the perspective of accountability.

National administration approval ratings are both a political asset of the ruling power and a driving force behind policy implementation. The KOSPI can rise like a roller coaster at any time, but reversing public sentiment once lost is not easy. To regain approval ratings, simply replacing personnel will not suffice. Policy direction, operational methods, and priorities must all be reorganized. The housing issue cannot be resolved through ideological or normative approaches alone. Supply speeds must be maximized, and tax policies should be rationally revised and supplemented to enhance predictability. The national administration's guiding principle must shift from value-based reforms and clarity to performance-oriented practical policies and flexibility. It also seems time for changes in the President's style of governance. If the early days of his term were marked by live broadcasts where he personally handled detailed administrative issues, it is now necessary to grant greater autonomy and accountability to the newly formed second-term cabinet. This is the final golden window to re-examine the mode of national administration.

"Please note that this article has been automatically translated by AI, and minor discrepancies from the original text may occur due to machine translation limits."