The recent exposure of Chinese individuals spying on military bases is a serious warning for our counterintelligence system. According to details released by police on the 11th, two Chinese nationals were arrested on suspicion of conducting information-gathering activities targeting ROK-U.S. military facilities in different ways.
A man in his 60s is suspected of illegally intercepting communications between fighter jets and control rooms using antennas, receivers, and laptops while staying at a hotel near Gunsan Airport, where ROK-U.S. air forces operate, in April this year. He reportedly entered the country multiple times on tourist visas since January this year, timed to coincide with ROK-U.S. air force training periods. Authorities are investigating from 2024 onward regarding suspicions of collecting such communications and identifying who received the data.
Another man in his 40s is suspected of operating a military supply store around the U.S. base in Pyeongtaek and providing money and goods to Korean women working at the base to gather information on ROK-U.S. joint exercises, weapon movements, and personnel changes within the U.S. command structure.
The former can be classified as signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities around military facilities, while the latter falls under human intelligence (HUMINT) activities involving the recruitment of insiders. Recently, there were also Chinese activities using drones and high-resolution cameras to gather imagery intelligence (IMINT) at the Busan naval base and Suwon airfield. China is collecting our military information in various forms.
Similar Chinese intelligence activities have already occurred abroad. In 2023, Swiss police investigated a Chinese couple who had purchased and operated a small hotel next to the Meiringen military airfield for five years. The hotel was located very close, allowing observation of fighter jet takeoffs and landings, base movements, and even interception of control tower communications. Particularly, since F-35A stealth fighters were scheduled to be stationed there, suspicions of Chinese intelligence activities arose. Although the couple returned to China immediately after the investigation and authorities could not definitively classify them as spies, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient.
The recent actions by these Chinese nationals clearly constitute espionage. What is regrettable is that while amendments to the Espionage Act in February allowed for the punishment of spies working for "foreign countries" rather than just "enemy nations," making it possible to prosecute Chinese spies, the effective date was September 13, so it cannot be applied to this case.
As U.S.-China hegemony competition intensifies recently, China's intelligence activities targeting U.S. forces have strengthened. The same applies to information gathering against our military, which is based on the ROK-U.S. alliance. A characteristic feature is mobilizing ordinary people who can naturally approach military bases, such as tourists and international students. They accumulate easily obtainable data like photographs and wireless communications and also gather small pieces of intelligence through individuals with access to the base. Even if individual pieces of information appear trivial, collecting fragmented intelligence over a long period regarding training cycles, sortie frequencies, unit movements, and commander replacements can construct strategic information at a significant level.
Our counterintelligence response must also change. Traditional military base security that strengthens guard posts and controls access ends with barbed wire fences, but the boundary of counterintelligence must extend far beyond that. There is a need to expand the national-level counterintelligence system to uncover spies lurking in nearby restaurants, lodging facilities, and entertainment venues, and to detect warning signs of intelligence gathering using advanced technologies in surrounding buildings and facilities.
in OPINION
