When wildfires break out, the first people heading to the sky are there. They are forest fire helicopters pilots who fly through thick smoke and strong winds, crossing mountain ridges to drop water. When major disasters or casualties occur, firefighting helicopters carry rescue team members and patients, sometimes flying over urban hanbok areas. Their missions are dangerous. Paradoxically, this means the aircraft they operate must be even safer. Recently, concerns have grown over proposed amendments to the 'Aviation Safety Act.' The amendments propose expanding the application of military airworthiness certification systems to aircraft used for search and rescue or wildfire suppression operations. They also state that if a military aircraft is modified after being retired from service, it would be treated as having received a 'Restricted Type Certificate,' making it easier to obtain airworthiness certification. The core of the amendment aims to manage resources more efficiently by reducing administrative and financial waste.
On the surface, this may seem reasonable. However, just because a purpose is noble does not justify the means. This is especially true in the area of 'Aviation Safety,' which directly affects citizens' lives. Airworthiness Certification is a system where the government verifies whether an aircraft can fly safely. It is a legal and technical safety mechanism through which the state validates safety to protect citizens' lives, serving as the starting point of the aviation safety system. Yet, this proposed amendment views this final safeguard of safety as 'duplicate regulation' or an 'administrative bottleneck.' This is a dangerous oversight that ignores the essence of aviation safety. If military aircraft are modified for wildfire suppression, additional water tanks or fire-fighting equipment may be added. Changes in weight and center of gravity can occur, and new loads may be placed on the structure. Therefore, not only must the modified parts be verified, but also their interaction with the original airframe must be thoroughly examined. The moment airworthiness certification is perceived as a mere procedure, the fundamental principles of aviation safety will inevitably be shaken.
Furthermore, aircraft safety is not maintained by a single certificate alone. The real question in aviation safety is not "Was this aircraft safe at first?" but "Is it still safe today?" A Continued Airworthiness system that manages and maintains an aircraft's safety from the start of its operation until its retirement is even more important. Laws can be changed overnight, but safety systems cannot be built in a day. Therefore, if jurisdiction is changed before it is proven that a new system has secured continued airworthiness capabilities equivalent to or greater than the existing system, significant gaps in safety management are deeply concerning. Since 2008, forest and firefighting aircraft have been managed under the national civil aviation safety system for airworthiness and operational safety, based on the rationale that they should not fall into a regulatory blind spot simply because they are classified as 'national institutional investors' or similar state-owned assets. Thus, any policy change that reverses this intent must be approached with even greater caution. Timing is also critical. South Korea is preparing for the ICAO's Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP-CMA) evaluation of its national aviation safety oversight system in December this year. Now is precisely the time to further solidify the consistency and sustained implementation capability of the safety management system, demonstrating our safety capabilities and reliability.
No one would deny the goal of enhancing disaster response capabilities. However, will the proposed amendments truly ensure greater safety for citizens than what we have now? Aviation safety often appears as an inconvenient regulation until an accident occurs. Nevertheless, safety can never be traded away for administrative convenience.
in OPINION
